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Stefano Curto
In recent months, data across the globe indicate that the
global recovery is under way. However, many analysts antic-
ipate that the recovery will be particularly uneven: strong
growth will resume in developing countries, with emerging
Asian economies leading the way out of global recession; and
developed countries will continue to struggle with a fragile
situation and no appetite by the central banks to raise rates
in the near future.
Interest rate differentials can only be expected to widen
—creating carry trade opportunities that produce a resur-
gence of unsustainable capital flows to developing countries,
exacerbate exchange rate pressure and sterilization policies,
and intensify global imbalances and reserve accumulations.
This macroeconomic and financial landscape is set to create
mounting incentives for emerging markets’ central banks to
allocate even more foreign reserves into SWFs to release the
pressure on money supply; reduce the cost of sterilization;
and use reserves in excess of prudential levels more produc-
tively, away from low-yield, dollar-denominated securities.
SWFs Assets and Portfolio
Precrisis estimates of SWFs assets were in the range of $13.4–
17.5 trillion by 2017.1 If the foreign assets under SWF man-
agement were to be invested under the reasonable assump    tion
of a mix between the portfolio allocations of Singapore and
Norway,2 at least $2.7–5.0 trillion of total assets theoretically
could be invested in developing countries by 2017 (equally
split between equities and bonds). Excluding the regions
where these funds originate (that is, Asia and the Middle
East), these assets could represent 8–16 percent of the com-
bined GDP in developing countries in Latin America, Africa,
and Eastern Europe; 1–2 percent of their market capitaliza-
tion of traded companies; and 10–19 percent of the total
debt securities in these regions.
However, no one knows with certainty the pace of re-
serves accumulation and the size of SWF increases at the
margin. On one hand, external imbalances are expected
(hoped) to somehow diminish in the medium term because
A prolonged and multispeed recovery period, its associated policy response, and the new global financial landscape
might have important bearing on the size and allocation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) assets. SWFs could
become a driving force in South-South flows, boosting global wealth by helping recycle large savings in surplus
countries toward more productive investments. Whereas they indeed represent a new opportunity for developing
countries, they also carry challenges for both home and host countries.surplus countries may be under pressure to increase internal
demand. On the other hand, the crisis and its associated pol-
icy response actions to support the global economy might
create mounting incentives for central banks to allocate even
more foreign reserves into SWFs, and for the SWFs to seek
higher alpha and lower beta.
Quite naturally, where SWFs invest is also going to be
governed by a number of considerations. Although devel-
oped countries, and the United States in particular, have
been the main recipients of SWFs’ investments to date, a
shift in attention toward developing countries’ securities is
likely to increase because of the economic prospects of de-
veloped countries in the medium and long terms. Despite
differences in investment strategies and appetite for risk and
liquidity—reflecting different objectives, liabilities structure,
and so forth—the desire to diversify their portfolios in the
hope of maximizing returns for acceptable levels of risk is a
common feature of all SWFs and will support such a shift
(albeit gradually).3
In addition to maximizing portfolio performance, portfo-
lio allocations may also have strategic considerations, like fu-
ture access to commodities.4 Before the crisis, for instance,
East Asia accounted for more than a quarter of global de-
mand for commodities and a significant portion of demand
for agricultural commodities (Lyons 2007). Gaining access
to strategic commodities and resources will require not only
contracts, but also mergers and acquisitions. In this regard,
it has been reported that a number of Chinese companies
already have been securing strategic assets in energy and raw
material supplies in Africa and Latin America, with the
backing of China’s government5—the Industrial and Com-
mercial Bank of China’s investment in Standard Chartered
was seen by many market analysts as China’s strategic entry
point into the African continent, using the bank as the prin-
cipal investment agent. In February 2010, the oil industry in
India called for the government to use parts of the $278 bil-
lion in foreign exchange reserves to create an SWF to com-
pete with China in the race to secure global energy assets.
The current levels of the stock markets in developed
countries may slow down the process of portfolio rebalanc-
ing as many investment opportunities might materialize in
the European Union, Japan, and the United States.6 More-
over, at a recent Official Monetary and Financial Institutions
Forum, attendees also emphasized the role that SWFs could
play in purchasing government bonds being issued by coun-
tries of the G-7 (projected by the International Monetary
Fund to rise from precrisis levels by an average 40 percent
of GDP by 2014).
A gradual shift toward developing countries’ investments
may be the most likely outcome. As reserves accumulate,
SWFs’ strategy will focus initially on a rebalancing from low-
yield assets into high-yield equities. Diversification away from
the G-7 is definitely going to be more gradual and incremen-
tal. SWFs will avoid a further depreciation of U.S. dollars; and
that, in turn, could generate large revaluation losses for the
central banks’ dollar-denominated assets as well as a slow-
down in future reserves accumulation. As long as countries
in which SWFs are fed by reserves’ accumulation resist the
appreciation of their currencies, a full diversification away
from the dollar will be difficult.7
Opportunities and Challenges for Host
Countries
Over the next decade, SWFs have the potential to boost
global wealth by helping recycle large savings in surplus
countries toward more productive investments, particularly
in the developing world. Over the medium term, many de-
veloping countries will continue to depend on external sav-
ings to finance critical investment.8 On the supply side, major
fiscal stimulus packages in advanced economies are likely to
result in a general repricing of sovereign debt risk and the as-
sociated cost of borrowing; and in more limited access to and
a crowding-out of credit for developing-country borrowers,
forcing some of them into fiscal austerity if they don’t find
alternative resources.
In this context, SWFs could bridge the gap between the
growing investment needs and the reduced supply of exter-
nal  resources,9 thereby  sustaining  growth,  accelerating
progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, in-
creasing economic integration, and helping build the foun-
dations for a multipolar world. Africa, in particular, may
benefit most from SWFs’ resources, given its relatively weak
starting point in trade, regional integration, infrastructure,
and private sector development.
Although SWFs could help recycle large savings gener-
ated  in  surplus  countries  toward  the  developing  world
where capital might be socially and economically more pro-
ductive, several concerns remain and the memory of the
1980s debt crisis fueled by the recycling of oil countries’ sav-
ings is still vivid.
Debt Run-Up
The current global savings glut may have similarities with
the recycling of oil countries’ savings that fueled the debt
crisis in the 1980s. In the 1970s and early 1980s, these wind-
falls were deposited in the West’s banks and eventually on-
lent to developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere.
Today, these windfalls may take the form of SWFs directed,
for example, to African countries that are becoming increas-
ingly attractive investment destinations; are growing at the
fastest rates in the past four decades; are reforming institu-
tions and improving governance; and, most important, have
had their government balance sheets virtually wiped free of
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tries and Multilateral Debt Relief initiatives.
Three important considerations should be well consid-
ered. First, even though their external debt may have been
slashed, many countries are burdened by domestic debt and
contingent liabilities related to loss-making state-owned
companies or possible banking system problems. Second, the
institutional capacity of countries to select high-rate-of-
return projects is often limited. Besides, the projects have to
be  implemented,  monitored,  and  maintained.  In  other
words, the paucity of investment funds may not be the bind-
ing constraint to growth and development. Third, portfolio
shifts by SWFs may put some upward pressure on the prices
of riskier asset classes, such as equities, and downward pres-
sure on bonds, thus increasing yield. Again the impact on
developing countries will not be negligible in terms of cost
of borrowing, for instance, and of inflated equity prices.10
Financial Stability
There are also concerns about the impact of SWFs’ in-
vestment on the financial stability recipients, particularly
those that have more shallow financial markets. Limited in-
formation about SWFs’ objectives, strategies, institutional
structure, and investment management may reinforce the
clouds around how SWFs’ behave:
• Pro-cyclicality and herding—SWFs are believed to be
countercyclical in supporting prices and markets, as
they have traditionally been on buy-and-hold strate-
gies. However, a pro-cyclical behavior cannot be ex-
cluded. Single individual transactions undertaken by
an SWF may disrupt more shallow financial markets
either because the funds may mirror hedge fund strate-
gies of portfolio rebalancing against possible losses or
because perceived shifts or rumors and second-guessing
about SWF investment decisions may cause volatility
and herding. For instance, the Singaporean SWF Tema  -
sek Holdings’ sale of shares in two big Chinese banks
(Bank of China and China Construction Bank) and in
Asia’s largest container-shipping group Cosco created
rumors about the health of the banking sector or the
belief that several areas of the Chinese economy had
reached their cyclical peak. That occurred despite
Temasek’s statements that the sale was just “part of
our ongoing rebalancing of the portfolio against new
opportunities” (Burton 2007).
• Short positions—We also cannot assume that undertak-
ing short positions in quick win-win situations will not
occur in the future, rather than waiting to step in when
asset prices fall. For instance, The Economist (2008)
mentioned that, four years ago, Norway’s SWFs began
to sell short the bonds of Iceland’s banks when a slow-
down of the economy was foreseen. There is also an-
ecdotal evidence that SWFs farm out part of their as-
sets to highly leveraged funds. For instance, a quarter
of Singapore’s SWF is believed to be channeled and
invested through hedge funds that use this strategy.11
Opportunities and Challenges for Home
Countries
The idea behind SWFs is quite simple: divert reserves in ex-
cess of those needed for short-term current and capital ac-
count  requirements12 or  for  stabilizing  exchange  rate
movements toward long-term diversified portfolios of equi-
ties and bonds.13 This is more risky than investing in U.S.
Treasury bills in the short run, but is also likely to yield
higher returns over the long haul. However, although the
idea is appealing and some benefits are undeniable, the fol-
lowing challenges are worth mentioning.
Net Wealth, Repatriation of Assets, and Dutch Disease
When a substantial amount of the reserve buildup has been
the counterpart of central banks’ sterilization,14 SWFs’ assets
can be considered as a purchase with government debt.
Therefore, a careful analysis of government whole balance
sheet effects is necessary to assess real net wealth, which
may not be as large as it first appears. The joint balance sheet
of government and the central bank actually would worsen
with domestic currency appreciation and high domestic in-
terest rates.
A potential currency mismatch is of particular concern
for developing countries in light of repatriation of returns
on investments because a country’s future needs (SWFs’ li-
abilities) are denominated in domestic currency while SWFs’
assets are denominated in foreign currencies. Real conver-
gence and catching up in emerging markets inevitably would
force domestic currencies to appreciate in real terms relative
to those of developed currencies (Balassa-Samuelson effect),
reducing the real (and/or nominal) value of repatriated
funds. In addition, as SWFs’ returns are repatriated, the in-
flux of dollars cannot avoid the need for an adjustment
when dollars are spent putting additional upward pressure
on their currencies and undermining the competitiveness of
the traded goods sectors.15
In the long run, it seems that some form of Dutch disease
is unavoidable for oil-exporting countries whose intention in
setting up SWFs is to avoid real exchange rate appreciation.
Opportunity Costs
The issue of investable surplus and real net wealth hints that
there are opportunity costs attached to the alternative uses
of SWFs’ assets. The opportunity costs arise from the fact
that in countries with underdeveloped social and economic
infrastructure, social and economic return on investment at
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abroad, regardless of the nature of that investment and in-
tergenerational preference of the government.16
Since 2003, China has used foreign exchange reserves to
support domestic policies with Central Huijin Investment
Company to absorb Central Huijin Investment Company
and to recapitalize the Agricultural Bank of China and the
China Development Bank, including dealing with bad loans.
Russia has taken advantage of the recent run-up in oil prices
to pay down its external debt, and some other governments
(such as Brazil) have considered the possibility of using a
share of their international reserves in a fund geared toward
the promotion of industrial policy.
For commodity SWFs, the issue of investing foreign re-
serves domestically is also a fiscal policy issue because for-
eign currency accrues directly to the government and is not
converted into domestic currency unless it is spent by the
government.
Notes
1. Projections by Morgan Stanley, Standard Chartered,
Merrill Lynch, and the International Monetary Fund esti-
mated that foreign assets under the management of SWFs
could reach US$12 trillion by 2012.
2. We assume that SWFs could invest 20–30 percent of
their assets in developing countries, with 45 percent allo-
cated into equities; 45 percent into bonds; and 10 percent
into private equity, real estate, and commodities.
3. In September 2009, the move by China Investment Cor-
poration (CIC) to take a $1 billion minority stake in the Hong
Kong, China–based Noble Group, a commodities trading/
supply chain manager, was a step in this direction. J.P. Mor-
gan calculates that other deals worth $50 billion of invest-
ments  are  likely  to  materialize  between  the  CIC  and
companies in developing countries.
4. Despite its early, visible stakes in Blackstone, Morgan
Stanley, and other financial institutions in the United States,
the CIC has also focused in other areas—namely, natural re-
sources (Wei 2007).
5. In addition to $1.6 billion of acquired assets at the end
of 2005, an additional $2.3 billion has been invested by
China National Offshore Oil Corporation in Nigerian oil and
gas exploration (Trinh 2006; Broadman 2007). China Devel-
opment Bank also has launched a $5.0 billion China-Africa
Development Fund to finance Chinese companies’ invest-
ment in Africa, following up what was agreed at the Beijing
Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accord-
ing to China’s Xinhua News Agency, Chinese and African
companies and governments at that summit signed 14 agree-
ments  worth  $1.9  billion  for  projects  in  infrastructure,
telecommunications, and other fields. A deal to build an $8.3
billion railway in oil-rich Nigeria was announced, as were
joint China-Africa plans to explore energy development.
6. An example is Abu Dhabi’s decision to buy 9.1 percent
of Daimler through Aabar Investments in March 2009.
7. At the consolidated level (including central banks’ pur-
chases), there is already some evidence of portfolio rebal-
ancing. The recent announcement about the sale of Chinese
holdings of U.S. Treasury debt in December 2009—ceding
its place as the world’s biggest foreign holder of U.S. debt to
Japan—provides clues about China’s appetite for loaning
money to the United States. China pared its Treasury hold-
ings by $34.0 billion, to $755.4 billion. Japan’s holdings total
$768.8 billion, according to U.S. Treasury estimates.
8. Excluding China and major oil exporters, developing
countries are (on average) net importers of capital; this
makes them dependent on external financing for critical in-
vestment.
9. Global Economic Prospects estimates that most of the
53 developing countries that faced an external financing gap
in 2009 had current account deficits of 5 percent or more,
with private-sourced net-debt inflows financing equivalent
to about 2.2 percent of GDP (0.8 percent if Central Asia
and Europe are excluded).
10. Warnock and Warnock (2005) underscore that total
foreign buying (private and official) of U.S. bonds in the
years leading up to 2005 kept the 10-year Treasury yield 150
basis points lower than it would have been without foreign
inflows. The same study estimates that without foreign offi-
cial buying, long-term rates would have been 60 basis points
higher. Miles and Jen (2007) estimate that, all other things
being equal, the emergence of SWFs could push up “safe”
bond yields over the next 10 years by 30–40 basis points and
could reduce the equity risk premium by 80–110 basis
points.
11. Jen (2008) estimates that SWFs may outplace 20 per-
cent or more of assets with external investors.
12. This  means  six  months  of  imports  or  equal  the
amount of short-term external debt (Guidotti-Greenspan
rule).
13. In line with long-standing tradition, reserves are in-
vested in safe but low-yield U.S. Treasury bills; when con-
verted into local currency terms, the return could be close
to zero or negative because of the depreciation of the dollar.
This might be aggravated by sterilization policies intended
to maintain price and exchange rate stability. The Bank for
International Settlements has estimated costs of sterilization
to be roughly 0.5–2.0 percent of GDP for 14 emerging mar-
kets. Similarly, Summers (2006) suggests that central banks’
portfolios have earned around 1 percent real returns annu-
ally over the past 60 years, in comparison with about 6 per-
cent for a portfolio diversified in stocks and bonds. With
foreign exchange reserves at 50 percent of GDP, in a country
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reserves amounts to 2.5 percent of GDP a year.
14. An analysis conducted by the Bank for International
Settlements suggests that, during the period from January
2000 to May 2006, sterilization might have offset as much
as 85-95 percent of changes in net foreign assets in India,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan (China), and over 70
percent and 60 percent, respectively, in the case of China
and Russia.
15. Real appreciation in the case of an exchange rate peg;
nominal appreciation in the case of floating or renouncing
of a peg. Bourdet and Falck (2006) studied the effect of
Cape Verde remittances on the traded goods sector. As local
incomes have risen with a doubling of remittances from
abroad, the Cape Verde real exchange rate appreciated 14
percent during the 1990s. The export sector of the Cape
Verde economy suffered a similar fall in productivity during
the same period—a fall caused entirely by capital flows.
16. Recently, several authors have attempted to measure
the opportunity cost of reserves accumulations. For instance,
Rodrik (2006) shows that there is a “social cost” to reserves
accumulation to the extent that the private sector borrows
at a higher rate than what the central bank earns on its for-
eign currency assets. Similarly, Summers (2006) suggests
higher costs based on the forgone return on infrastructure
projects.
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